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$EVWUDFW
Corporate governance is a multiple term which means control, leadership, individualism and business management in the 
area of corporations and economic systems (MacKenzie, 1992). It represents a whole community of stakeholders, 
employees and customers. In this paper, we will examine the relations inside the corporations, we will also define the 
term: corporate governance and we will give the synthesis of Board directors and CEO councils around the world. A
logical question that arise is, if the leader of a corporation has to cooperate or it makes more sense if he takes all the 
decisions by himself. Is today's corporate leaders a kind of heroes and in which cases? The idea of control and 
individualism is not a new idea but under certain factors it means responsibility, business ability and capacity to any 
change. Organizational change and ability to control or to guide people and corporations is a unique strategic advantage
and make the difference to all kinds of leadership.
© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the 
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,QWURGXFWLRQ

Corporate governance is a number of processes, customs, policies and laws which have impact on the way a 
company or corporation is directed, administered and controlled and also defines the relationship between 
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stakeholders as well as the goals of a corporation. Both parties are accurate and, in fact, with corporate 
governance, the stakeholders are the shareholders, the board of directors, the employees, the customers, the 
creditors, the suppliers and the whole community. So, the corporation should be governed in a way that 
everyone benefits according to their role within that very corporation. A well- defined and enforced corporate 
governance provides a structure that, at least in theory, works for the benefit of everyone concerned by 
ensuring that the enterprise adheres to accepted ethical standards and best practices as well as to formal laws. 
To that end, organizations have been formed at the regional, national, and global levels.
)LHOGVRI&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFH

These fields include areas such as:
x Accountability: These advocate the implementation of guidelines and mechanisms to ensure management 
acts and protection of public organisation from wrongdoing.
x Economic efficiency: This involves how the corporate governance system intends to optimise results 
(MacKenzie, 1992). 
x Strategic efficiency: Involves public policy objectives not directly measurable in economic terms such as 
alleviation of poverty, access to markets, income stabilisation, health care and job creation. 
x Stakeholder: This area of study focuses more attention on other stakeholders such as citizens, employees, 
businesses and other levels of government i.e. provincial, municipal or local authorities. Since 2001, the 
interest in corporate governance practices has increased (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This is mostly due to 
the high profile collapses of such large name companies as Enron and MCI WorldCom. In fact, in 2002, 
the US government passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that was intended to restore the public’s confidence in 
corporate governance once more (Velentzas and Broni, 2010). Effective or heroic corporate governance 
relies on certain laws to be passed, as well as a certain commitment from the marketplace and also a 
healthy board culture, as long as this will make sure policies and processes remain constant and stable
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
2. 1. Example
It is easier to point out examples of "bad" governance than "good" governance. The most famous example of 
bad governance is Enron. Executives lied about Enron’s financial results for years in order to increase the 
value of personal stock options. Their actions went undetected by the board, the auditor, ratings agencies, 
regulators, and the media for many years until the company ultimately collapsed into bankruptcy (Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). If Enron had had a more effective governance system in place, this behaviour 
would have been detected many years earlier and management would have been replaced. How a company is 
managed, in terms of the institutional systems and protocols meant to ensure accountability and sound ethics. 
The concept encompasses a variety of issues, including disclosure of information to shareholders and board 
members, remuneration of senior executives, potential conflicts of interest among managers and directors, 
supervisory structures.
2. 2. The emperor has no clothes
Corporate governance is parallelized with so much smoke, that we have lost sight of the fire. This fire is 
the real message and definition of corporate governance, which is undoubtedly beneficial to all, that should be 
good directors. We all want to increase the value, and Corporate Governance is often seen as cost ineffective, 
bringing little or no benefits - the smoke gets in the eyes, as it were. What someone the leader or the hero 
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needs to do is to apply the principles of good governance to the whole corporation (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). This could be described as: "looking at Management and Heroic Leadership through Corporate 
Governance-tinted glasses" i.e. taking a fresh look at management structure taking into account all interested 
parties and ensuring all the necessary monitoring, control and individualism are in place to ensure that 
shareholder value is always at the forefront (Sampson, 1988). So, the definition of corporate governance is: 
"Effective corporate governance ensures that long-term strategic objectives and plans are established, and that 
the proper management and management structure are in place to achieve those objectives, while at the same 
time making sure that the structure functions to maintain the corporation’s integrity, reputation, and 
accountability to its relevant constituencies".
'HILQLWLRQRI&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFH

The definition of corporate governance most widely used is: "the system by which companies are directed 
and controlled" (Cadbury Committee, 1992). More specifically it is the framework by which the various 
stakeholder interests are balanced and it represents "the relationships among the management, Board of 
Directors, controlling shareholders, minority shareholders and other stakeholders".
Corporate governance consists of two elements (Velentzas and Broni, 2010a): 
The long term relationship which has to deal with checks and balances, incentives for manager and 
communications between management and investors; The transactional relationship which involves dealing 
with disclosure and authority (Velentzas, Mamalis and Broni, 2010).This implies an adversarial relationship 
between management and investors and an attitude of mutual suspicion. Corporate governance is consisting of 
five elements which the board must consider (Hart, 1995) 
x long term strategic goals
x employees: past, present and future
x environment / community
x customers / suppliers
x compliance legal / regulatory
This definition was endorsed by Sir Adrian Cadbury describing Five Golden Rules by which a system of good 
corporate governance should be operated and set out a practical methodology for implementing and 
monitoring Real World Corporate Governance.  

/HDGHUVKLSWKHNH\HOHPHQWLQFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFH

Management leadership, especially top management, is probably the most critical element in a major 
organizational change effort such as corporate governance (Fletcher and Käufer, 2003). This leadership role 
cannot be delegated, for example, to a consultant (Arrow, 1974).Two recent change efforts dramatically 
illustrate this point: In 1983, CEO Don Lennox, along with other top managers, assessed the firm's 
management practices, concluding that improvements were needed. After studying change efforts at other 
companies, they decided the top officers should become the change agents in their own units. Team-building 
was used extensively. The resulting Continuous Improvement Teams CITs were led not by human resource or 
organization development specialists but by middle-level line managers. Along with other management-led 
interventions, CITs have changed the company from a sluggish, unprofitable bureaucracy into a streamlined, 
world-class manufacturer with a solid reputation as an innovator (Broni, 2010). 
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6HSDUDWLRQRI2ZQHUVKLSDQG&RQWURO

The corporation, in contrast, for example, to a partnership, separates ownership from operational control; 
this concept is, of course, fundamental to any definition of corporate governance and is commonly referred to 
as the agency issue, or Agency Theory. It is this separation which creates the need for systems of independent 
monitoring and control (Jensen, 1993). It was the freedom that this separation created to take much bigger 
risks in order to expand that prevented for so long the permission of such organizations to exist, with the 
potential dangers it implied. And it is this freedom which has required mechanisms to be constructed to try 
and prevent it being abused. Historically, in Western societies, the individualistic approach can be seen as a 
matter of leadership, governance and corporate behavior in various areas of corporate governance (Hoffman, 
1981; Hosking, 1995). 
'LIIHUHQW&RXQWULHV'LIIHUHQW0RGHOV

This has led to different systems in different countries, depending on which constituent or interested party 
in the company’s operations has been given the most importance. In the Anglo-Saxon world, for example, 
there has always been a single board of directors consisting of executive and non-executive, or independent 
directors (Jensen, 1993). Elsewhere, a two tier structure exists to balance the executive board with 
representatives from other stakeholder groups like employees and bankers like the Supervisory Board in 
Germany.
3ULQFLSOHVRIFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFH

x Rights and equitable treatment of shareholders: Organizations should respect the rights of shareholders and 
help shareholders to exercise those rights. They can help shareholders exercise their rights by openly and 
effectively communicating information and by encouraging shareholders to participate in general meetings.
x Interests of other stakeholders: Organizations should recognize that they have legal, contractual, social, and 
market driven obligations to non-shareholder stakeholders, including employees, investors, creditors, 
suppliers, local communities, customers, and policy makers.
x Role and responsibilities of the board: The board needs sufficient relevant skills and understanding to 
review and challenge management performance. It also needs adequate size and appropriate levels of 
independence and commitment (Velentzas and Broni, 2010a). 
x Integrity and ethical behaviour: Integrity should be a fundamental requirement in choosing corporate 
officers and board members. Organizations should develop a code of conduct for their directors and 
executives that promotes ethical and responsible decision making.
x Disclosure and transparency: Organizations should clarify and make publicly known the roles and 
responsibilities of board and management to provide stakeholders with a level of accountability. They 
should also implement procedures to independently verify and safeguard the integrity of the company's 
financial reporting. Disclosure of material matters concerning the organization should be timely and 
balanced to ensure that all investors have access to clear, factual information (Arrow, 1974). 
&RUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFHPRGHOVDURXQGWKHZRUOG

8. 1. Continental Europe
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Some continental European countries, including Germany and the Netherlands, require a two-tiered Board 
of Directors as a means of improving corporate governance ( Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). In the two-
tiered board, the Executive Board, made up of company executives, generally runs day-to-day operations 
while the supervisory board, made up entirely of non-executive directors who represent shareholders and 
employees, hires and fires the members of the executive board, determines their compensation, and reviews 
major business decisions.
8. 2. The United States and the UK
The so-called "Anglo-American model" also known as "the unitary system" emphasizes a single-tiered 
Board of Directors composed of a mixture of executives from the company and non-executive directors, all of 
whom are elected by shareholders. Non-executive directors are expected to outnumber executive directors and 
hold key posts, including audit and compensation committees. Individual rules for corporations are based 
upon the corporate charter and, less authoritatively, the corporate by laws. Shareholders cannot initiate 
changes in the corporate charter although they can initiate changes to the corporate by laws (Grossman and
Hart, 1982). 
+LVWRU\

In the 20th century in the immediate aftermath of the Wall Street Crash of 1929 legal scholars such as 
Adolf Augustus Berle, Edwin Dodd, and Gardiner C. Means pondered on the changing role of the modern 
corporation in society. Berle and Means' monograph 'The Modern Corporation and Private Property' 1932 
continues to have a profound influence on the conception of corporate governance in scholarly debates today. 
From the Chicago school of economics, Ronald Coase's 'The Nature of the Firm' 1937 introduced the notion 
of transaction costs into the understanding of why firms are founded and how they continue to behave 
(Velentzas and Broni, 2010c). 
Fifty years later, Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen's 'The Separation of Ownership and Control' 1983, 
Journal of Law and Economics firmly established agency theory as a way of understanding corporate 
governance: the firm is seen as a series of contracts. Agency theory's dominance was highlighted in a 1989 
article by Kathleen Eisenhardt 'Agency theory: an assessment and review', Academy of Management Review. 
Over the past three decades, corporate directors' duties in the U.S. have expanded beyond their traditional 
legal responsibility of duty of loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders. 
3DUWLHVWRFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFH
The most influential parties involved in corporate governance include government agencies and authorities, 
stock exchanges, management including the board of directors and its chair, the Chief Executive Officer or 
the equivalent, other executives and line management, shareholders and auditors. Other influential 
stakeholders may include lenders, suppliers, employees, creditors, customers and the community at large. The 
agency view of the corporation posits that the shareholder forgoes decision rights control and entrusts the 
manager to act in the shareholders' best joint interests (Jensen, 1993). A board of directors is expected to play 
a key role in corporate governance (Freeman, 1974). The board has the responsibility of endorsing the 
organization's strategy, developing directional policy, appointing, supervising and remunerating senior 
executives and ensuring accountability of the organization to its investors and authorities (Arrow, 1974). 
)LQDQFLDOUHSRUWLQJWKHLQGHSHQGHQWDXGLWRUDQGWKHLGHDRILQGLYLGXDOLVP
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
The board of directors has primary responsibility for the corporation's external financial reporting 
functions. The Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer are crucial participants and boards usually 
have a high degree of reliance on them for the integrity and supply of accounting information. They oversee 
the internal accounting systems and are dependent on the corporation's accountants and internal auditors 
(Jensen, 1993). To reduce the risk and to enhance the perceived integrity of financial reports, corporation 
financial reports must be audited by an independent external auditor who issues a report that accompanies the 
financial statements. One area of concern is whether the auditing firm acts as both the independent auditor and 
management consultant to the firm they are auditing. This may result in a conflict of interest which places the 
integrity of financial reports in doubt due to client pressure to appease management. The power of the 
corporate client to initiate and terminate management consulting services and, more fundamentally, to select 
and dismiss accounting firms contradicts the concept of an independent auditor (Grossman and Hart, 1988). 

6\VWHPLFSUREOHPVRIFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFH

x Demand for information: In order to influence the directors, the shareholders must combine with others to 
form a voting group which can pose a real threat of carrying resolutions or appointing directors at a general 
meeting.
x Monitoring costs: A barrier to shareholders using good information is the cost of processing it, especially 
to a small shareholder. The traditional answer to this problem is the efficient market hypothesis in finance, 
the efficient market hypothesis E.M.H. asserts that financial markets are efficient, which suggests that the 
small shareholder will free ride on the judgments of larger professional investors (Blair, 1995). 
x Supply of accounting information: Financial accounts form a crucial link in enabling providers of finance 
to monitor directors. Imperfections in the financial reporting process will cause same imperfections in the 
effectiveness of corporate governance (Hart, 1995). This should, ideally, be corrected by the working of 
the external auditing process.
&RQVHTXHQFHVIRU&RUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFHDQGLQGLYLGXDOLVP

As already stated, the vast majority of research and theory in the area of organizational behaviour and 
management sciences is based on the principal assumptions inherent in self-contained individualism 
(Hosking, Dachler and Gergen, 1995). While such a socially constructed world view has given rise to many 
important insights and has provided very successful and helpful explanatory frameworks, it has 
simultaneously negated alternative conceptions and explanatory options that could provide crucial answers to 
new challenges faced by a rapidly changing world plagued by widespread disputes. Symptomatic of the 
individualistic bases for corporate governance is the large variety of extremely differentiated and highly 
characteristic stories, concepts and figures of speeches for describing the individual.
But if we wish to say something about relationships, the vocabulary available is rather restricted, and it is 
far more difficult to describe relationships as comprehensively as it is to describe the individual. The crucial 
and complex aspects of organizations are not the individual members but the way in which social 
relationships and communication function in holding an organizational system together that would otherwise 
slowly drift apart. If one looks at the main themes that dominate organizational research, the focus is on 
motivation, satisfaction, decision-making and developing strategies, teams, fear, stress, power, and the 
efficiency of the work process. These are, in effect, issues of a community of practice and not of individuals 
per se. The main themes in corporate governance have to do with issues such as trust in the leadership, 
availability and distribution of information, team conflicts, power struggles, dismissals of employees and 
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managers, mobbing, erroneous decisions and strategies, prejudice of various kinds, and so on ( Hosking, 
2006). 
3RVWKHURLFFRUSRUDWHOHDGHUVKLSDQGLQGLYLGXDOLVP

Practitioners, as well as organizational researchers, have increasingly come to the conclusion that, in 
today's globalized economy, organizations of all kinds must find their competitive advantage (Lazonick, 
1991) in more effective development of the prerequisites for organizational learning and greater creativity, as 
well as more effective mutual communication processes in the organization and its environment (Fletcher, 
2004). In general, this emphasizes the development of abilities and the empowerment of organizational 
members on all levels, constructive handling of criticism and dealing fairly with the different perspectives of 
organization members. In the context of such challenges, it is not surprising that the first attempts to develop 
alternative leadership concepts have appeared in the literature in what could be called "post-heroic" leadership 
research (Fletcher, 2004; Fletcher & Käufer, 2003; Pearce & Conger, 2003; Dachler, 1999; Dachler and
Hosking, 1995; Hosking, 2006). The general question asked in these early studies on alternative concepts of 
leadership is what happens to the notion of leaders when it no longer makes sense to conceptualize them as 
heroes. There are a number of fundamental theoretical considerations whereby post-heroic differs from 
individual conceptions of leadership (Hosking, 2006). 
Foremost is the assumption that leadership is a mutual and integral process that is played out and 
distributed over the entire organization. For example, it is understood that a CEO who is perceived as the 
"head' of an organization assumes that position out of legal and public relations considerations. However, 
rather than attributing heroic characteristics to such a person, it is understood that a CEO is empowered, 
enabled and supported by a large and complex network of leadership practices distributed throughout the 
entire organization, operating in concert with various actors and institutions in the organizational environment 
(Grossman and Hart, 1988). It is important to realize that the recognizable, public results of an organization 
are made possible by the cooperative processes of organizational life and not by the actions of selected 
individuals at the "head" of an organization.
Inherent in a relational understanding of leadership is the idea of change (Fletcher, 2004). The focus rests 
on the expected results of the leadership process. Social interactions that are understood as leadership within 
the particular cultural context of an organization and its societal surroundings are those that result in learning 
and development for both the organization and the actors involved. In this case, leadership involves the social 
construction of a context in which mutual enabling processes can take place, in which knowledge is generated 
and distributed, and where joint learning, especially learning on the basis of diversity, is made possible. In 
today's conflict-ridden world, we might be forgiven for concluding that such views of leadership and other, 
similar conceptions of organizational issues are somewhat naive, or at least too complex, too idealistic or too 
unrealistic for organizations trying to survive in a global and highly competitive market (Arrow, 1974). 
&RQFOXVLRQ

There are good reasons why the vast majority of organizational research, while certainly contributing to 
some very useful insights into the nature of organizations (Arrow, 1974) has sadly failed to understand, and 
therefore contribute to long-term, sustainable change. From a social constructionist point of view, long-term, 
sustainable change cannot be some final, objective 'end state'. Instead such change has to be viewed as an 
ongoing process, one whose final outcome cannot be known in an absolute sense but whose emergence and 
development can be constructed in some valued manner. Much of the research on organizational change still 
contains fundamental ideas that directly or indirectly value or contribute to competition, dominance, 
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delimitation, distrust, subject - object relationships, and so on. Thus, it is the overall methodology, i.e., the 
way we do organizational research, central assumptions and general hypotheses and the vast array of 
corresponding measurement and analyses tools, through which corporate governance constructs 
organizational change ( Feyerabend, 1988; Gergen, 1994; Dachler, 2000).

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